In re: Avandia Marketing by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-12-2016 
In re: Avandia Marketing 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"In re: Avandia Marketing" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 153. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/153 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-2145 
_______________ 
 
IN RE:  AVANDIA MARKETING SALES PRACTICES AND  
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
  Staci Laurino, 
   Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2-12-cv-03683 and 2-07-md-01871) 
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 20, 2016 
 
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 12, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Staci Laurino appeals from the order of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”).  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Laurino is a former user of Avandia, a prescription diabetes drug manufactured by 
GSK.  The drug works by lowering blood sugar levels.  On behalf of a putative class of 
similarly situated individuals, she alleged that GSK violated the Missouri Merchandising 
Practices Act (“MMPA”).  According to her amended complaint, GSK, even though it 
had notice of the “dangerous propensities” associated with Avandia, “engaged in 
misrepresentations, and failed to adequately advise consumers and medical providers of 
the risks of Avandia, including but not limited to the increased risk of heart attacks and 
deaths.”  (JA71.)  Laurino further alleged that Avandia is not more efficacious than other 
treatments for Type II diabetes and that the drug significantly increases the risk of heart-
related diseases.  “The actual value of Avandia was/is significantly less than the value of 
Avandia as represented by GSK, and thus, Plaintiff and other consumers suffered 
ascertainable loss when they purchased Avandia.”  (JA72.)  She sought damages equal to 
the difference between the drug’s actual value and the value of the drug had it been as 
represented by GSK.   
 The initial complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri.  The matter was transferred to the Avandia MDL proceeding 
pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  After Laurino filed an amended 
complaint, GSK moved to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Relying on a non-precedential opinion 
considering a similar claim arising out of this MDL proceeding, see In re Avandia Mktg., 
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2014), the District Court 
indicated that Laurino had standing.  Nevertheless, the District Court then determined 
that Laurino received all of the benefits of taking Avandia without suffering any harm 
and thereby sustained no ascertainable loss.  Because she failed to state a claim under the 
MMPA (and because the District Court believed that any further amendment would be 
inequitable and likely futile), it dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. 
II. 
 Under the MMPA, “[t]he act, use or employment by any person of any deception, 
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, 
suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement 
of any merchandise in trade or commerce . . . , in or from the state of Missouri, is 
declared to be an unlawful practice.”1  Mo. Stat. Ann. § 407.020.1.  “Any person who 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  GSK 
argues that Laurino failed to allege the injury in fact and causation required for standing 
under Article III of the Constitution for the same reasons that she had failed to state a 
claim under the MMPA.  As the District Court observed, this Court held in another 
Avandia appeal that it “was ‘satisfied that [the plaintiff’s] allegations are sufficient to 
establish Article III standing even though, as set forth herein, they are legally insufficient 
to provide a basis for relief.’”  Laurino v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (In re Avandia 
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.), 100 F. Supp. 3d 441, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2015)     
(quoting Avandia, 564 F. App’x at 673 n.4).  We see no reason to reach a different 
conclusion in this appeal. 
 
 We exercise de novo review over a district court’s order granting a motion to 
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purchases or leases merchandise primarily for personal, family or household purposes 
and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a 
result of”  an unlawful practice may bring a civil action.  Mo. Stat. Ann. § 407.025.1.     
 The District Court concluded that Laurino failed to satisfy this “ascertainable loss” 
 requirement.  Laurino vigorously contests the District Court’s conclusion.  According to 
her, the District Court erroneously relied on the lack of physical injury and “misapplied 
Missouri law providing that ascertainable loss can be established through the benefit-of-
the-bargain rule, ‘which compares the actual value of the item to the value of the item if it 
had been as represented at the time of the transaction.’”  (Appellant’s Brief at 9 (quoting 
Plubell v. Merck & Co., Inc., 289 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).)  Laurino 
argues that the District Court rejected the state’s benefit-of-the-bargain rule, 
impermissibly opined on her ability to prove damages, disregarded Missouri case law 
(especially the opinion rendered by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Plubell) in violation 
of well-established principles governing how federal courts must apply state law, and 
improperly relied on unrepresentative federal decisions that are inconsistent with other 
federal court decisions applying Missouri law.  We nevertheless agree with the District 
Court and GSK that “Plaintiff received all the benefits of taking Avandia without any 
harm, and therefore suffered no [ascertainable] loss.”  Laurino, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 447.  
                                                                                                                                                             
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  See, e.g., Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 
F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).  The plaintiff must allege in the complaint “enough 
facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The Court reviews a district court’s refusal to grant leave to 
amend for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
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 Initially, the District Court properly applied the general standards governing 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim as well as the principles guiding the federal 
courts in their application of state law.  As the District Court recognized, a federal court, 
in the absence of a state supreme court ruling on point, looks to the pronouncements of 
the lower state courts as well as federal cases interpreting state law.  See, e.g., State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 (3d Cir. 2000).  Accordingly, the 
District Court thoroughly considered the Plubell opinion, pointing, inter alia, to the state 
intermediate appellate court’s holding that, “because the plaintiffs alleged the drug was 
worth less than the product as represented, ‘they stated an objectively ascertainable loss 
under the MMPA using the benefit-of-the-bargain rule,’ and therefore did not need to 
show the cost of alternative therapy.”  Laurino, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (quoting Plubell, 
289 S.W.3d at 714-15).  However, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained “that it was 
ruling in the context of class certification under Missouri law, at which stage of the 
proceedings ‘whether a plaintiff is able to prove a theory is irrelevant because the sole 
issue is whether the certification requirements were met.’”  Id. (quoting Plubell, 289 
S.W.3d at 715).  According to the Plubell court, it did not “inquire whether the plaintiffs 
will prevail on the merits or even whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action.”  
Plubell, 289 S.W.3d at 713 (citing Craft v. Philip Morris Cos., 190 S.W.3d 368, 377 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2005)).  In contrast, we (like the District Court) must decide whether the 
plaintiff “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” pursuant to Rule 
                                                                                                                                                             
Co., 337 F.3d 297, 303 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003).    
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12(b)(6).  See Saavedra v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:12-cv-9366-SVW (MANx), 2014 WL 
7338930, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014) (“Moreover, Plubell made this statement while 
considering class certification under a state procedural rule that did not allow courts to 
conduct even a preliminary inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.” (citing Plubell, 
289 S.W.3d at 712)); Mikhlin v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:14-CV-881 RLW, 2014 WL 
6084004, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2014) (distinguishing Craft, Plubell, and Hope v. 
Nissan North America, Inc., 353 S.W.3d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), as class certification 
cases). 
 Laurino received the drug she was prescribed, the drug did the job it was meant to 
do (i.e., controlled her blood sugar levels), and it caused no apparent physical injuries.  
Under such circumstances, there could be no ascertainable loss.  “[S]he ‘received all the 
benefits [she] desired and [was] unaffected by Defendants’ alleged concealment.’”  
Laurino, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (quoting In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 897, 912 (W.D. Mo. 2009)).  In short, Laurino 
received the benefit of the bargain and accordingly sustained no ascertainable damages 
under the MMPA.  See, e.g., Mikhlin, 2014 WL 6084004, at *3 (“The Court, however, 
agrees with the reasoning of In re BPA I in holding that Plaintiffs have suffered no 
injury.  Plaintiffs allege that they used Johnson’s® Baby Powder, but do not allege that 
they have suffered any medical consequences. . . . The Court believes Plaintiffs’ 
proposed liability theory, which requires no demonstrable loss of any benefit, would lead 
to absurd results and holds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim as a matter of law.” 
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(footnotes omitted)); Bisphenol-A, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (“The second category of 
Plaintiffs consists of those who disposed of or used the products before learning about 
BPA. . . . While they may contend they would not have purchased the goods had they 
known about BPA, these Plaintiffs received 100% use (and benefit) from the products 
and have no quantifiable damages.”). 
 According to Laurino, the District Court committed reversible error by dismissing 
her amended complaint with prejudice.  While continuing to insist that the District Court 
misinterpreted Missouri law, she asserts that, if we disagree, “amendment should be 
allowed to address issues on which the district court ruled for the first time below.”  
(Appellant’s Reply Brief at 25.)  However, she does not provide any indication that the 
fundamental “ascertainable loss” deficiency identified by the District Court could be 
corrected in a second amended complaint.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by concluding that “to allow any further amendment would be inequitable 
and likely futile.”  Laurino, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 447 (footnote omitted).       
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
Avandia’s motion to dismiss. 
